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ABSTRACT 
This paper reflects on the role of the prim.a facie exclusionary 
rule as a remedy for breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. Current New Zealand case law establishes this rule as 
the principal recourse for breaches of sections 21, 22 and 23 of 
the Bill of Rights Act. 
It is the thesis of this paper that the main role of any remedy 
should be the effective vindication of the rights of the accused. 
Recent comment by the Court of Appeal, together with a recent 
Privy Council decision, could undermine the role of this remedy. 
This paper examines the alternative approaches available, 
including the Law Commision's "improperly obtained evidence 
rule." The conclusion is that this rule allows too much judicial 
discretion and is not an effective remedy for a violation of 
human rights, while other alternatives such as the Police 
Complaints Authority and the civil action are also considered to 
be ineffective remedies. 
The paper concludes that the goal of vindication is best served 
by the retention of the prim.a facie exclusionary rule in its current 
form. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and 
the abstract) comprises approximately 11,960 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act has to be applied in 
our society in a realistic way. Prima facie, however, a 
violation of rights should result in the ruling out of 
evidence obtained thereby. I 
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The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is an affirmation of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of New Zealanders. 
The Act does not, however, provide a remedy for those whose 
rights are breached. The prima fade exclusionary rule is a judge-
made remedy which is applied to deem evidence obtained in 
breach of the Bill of Rights inadmissible. 
There are three reasons why now is an opportune time to reflect 
on the prima fade exclusionary rule. Firstly, there is the Court of 
Appeal decision in R v Grayson and Taylor2 that has, at the very 
least, threatened the continued existence of the rule. Secondly, 
there is the recent Privy Council decision in Mohammed v The 
State3 that may provide the New Zealand Court of Appeal with 
the opportunity to reconsider the rule. Although the Mohammed 
decision is not binding on the Court of Appeal, it is very 
persuasive. Lastly, the New Zealand Law Commission has 
recently released its Evidence Code which includes the 
"improperly obtained evidence rule", an alternative to the prima 
fade exclusionary rule. 
This paper will discuss the current status of the prima fade 
1 R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257, 266 (CA) per Cooke P. 
2 R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA). 
3 Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 WLR 552 (PC). 
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exclusionary rule in New Zealand. This analysis will begin with 
the rationale and initial development of the rule. New Zealand 
case law will be summarised to determine in what circumstances 
the rule will be applied in this country. 
Part II will discuss the Privy Council decision in Mohammed. The 
reasoning adopted by their Lordships will be analysed to 
consider the likely effect on New Zealand jurisprudence. 
The fourth part of the paper will outline the Law Commission's 
proposed improperly obtained evidence rule. The proposal will 
be discussed in the context of current New Zealand law. Other 
alternatives to the prima fade exclusionary rule such as the 
Police Complaints Authority and the civil remedy of 
compensation and damages will be considered in Part V. The 
focus will be on their effectiveness as remedies for violations of 
human rights. 
The issue of whether there should be a distinction between the 
admissibility of real and confessional evidence will also be 
discussed in Part V. To date our Courts have resisted a 
wholesale embracement of this concept but there have been 
indications that such a distinction might be adopted. 
The sixth section of this paper will discuss the best approach to 
be taken by the Court of Appeal when it reconsiders the prima 
facie exclusionary rule. The paper concludes that the rule 
should be retained in its current form as·it is the most effective 
remedy for a breach of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. 
7 
II THE NEW ZEALAND PRIMA FACIE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE 
A Introduction 
Prior to the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 ("the Bill of Rights" or "the Act") the exclusion of evidence 
was governed by the common law principle that4 -
evidence obtained by illegal searches and the like is 
admissible subject only to a discretion, based on the 
jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process, to rule it out 
in particular instances on the ground of unfairness to 
the accused. 
Where evidence is challenged other than under the Bill of Rights, 
admissibility is still determined in accordance with the above 
principle. s 
Challenges based on the Bill of Rights primarily stem from 
alleged breaches of section 21, 22 or 23. Section 21 provides6 -
21. Unreasonable search and seizure -Everyone has the 
right to be secure against unreasonable search and ·. 
seizure, whether of the person, property, or 
4 R v Coombs (1985) 1 NZLR 318, 321 (CA). 
5 R v Laugalis (1993) 1 HRNZ 466, 474 (CA). 
6 Obviously, for the Bill of Rights to apply there must be a breach of a protected right. In the case of an 
alleged breach of s21 it must also be shown that the search itself was unreasonable. The interpretation of 
this term by our Court of Appeal has prevented many accused from being able to benefit from the prima 
fade exclusionary rule. See Hart Schwartz "The Short Happy Life and Tragic Death of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act" (1998) NZ Law Rev 259, 262; Andrew S Butler "The End of Precedent and Principle in 
Bill of Rights Cases? A Note on R v Grayson" (1997) NZ Law Rev 274; Scott Optican "Rolling Back s21 of 
the Bill of Rights" (1997) NZLJ 42. 
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correspondence or otherwise. 
Section 22 states that "everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
arrested or detained." 
Section 23 sets out the rights of persons detained or arrested. 
The section reads -
23. Rights of persons arrested or detained - (1) 
Everyone who is arrested or who is detained under any 
enactment-
(a) Shall be informed at the time of the arrest or 
detention of the reason for it; and 
(b) Shall have the right to consult and instruct a 
lawyer without delay and to be informed of that 
right; and 
(c) Shall have the right to have the validity of the 
arrest or detention determined without delay by 
way of habeas corpus and to be released if the 
arrest or detention is not lawful. 
(2) Everyone who is arrested for an offence has the right 
to be charged promptly or to be released. 
(3) Everyone who is arrested for an offence and is not 
released shall be brought as soon as possible before a 
court or competent tribunal. 
( 4) Everyone who is -
(a) Arrested; or 
(b) Detained under any enactment -
for any offence or suspected offence shall have the right 
to refrain from making any statement and to be 
informed of that right. 
(5) Everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of 
the person. 
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The most commonly alleged breach under this section is related 
to the "right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and 
to be informed of that right." 
B The Development of the Rule 
1 The Rationale 
The prima facie exclusionary rule was introduced in New 
Zealand because exclusion of evidence was seen as being the 
most effective way of vindicating a breach of a criminal 
accused's rights under sections 21, 22 and 23. Exclusion of the 
evidence returned the individual to the position he or she was in 
prior to the breach occurring. This remedy reflected the 
importance of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 7 
Richardson J, as he then was, affirmed that the vindication of 
rights was the basis for the rule in the Goodwin case.s He stated 
that the primary focus of the Act is rights centred and that "the 
primary thrust of the statute is on the positive assurance of rights 
rather than on the deterrence of official misconduct."9 
Richardson J's article entitled "Rights Jurisprudence - Justice for 
All?" further outlines his view on the justification of the ~ule as 
followslO -
The Bill of Rights is "rights-centred" and the statement 
of civil and political rights is in broad and imprecise 
7 R v Kirift (1992] 2 NZLR 8 (CA), R v Butcher, above nl. 
8 R v Goodwin (1993] 2 NZLR 153 (CA). 
9 R v Goodwin , above n8, 193 per Richardson J. 
1 0 Sir Ivor Richardson "Rights Jurisprudence - Justice for All?" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the 
Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 61, 71. 
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language which may encourage a generous 
interpretation. Given that rights-centred focus, where 
there has been a violation of a right, primacy should be 
given to the vindication of human rights in determining 
what remedy should be provided. 
In the case of R v Butcher11, Cooke P (as he then was) discussed at 
length the significance to be attached to the Bill of Rights. 
Although not entrenched, the Act is an affirmation of the rights 
of New Zealanders. The "correct judicial response" could only 
be to give the Act primacy subject to other legislation as required 
by section 4.12 
The vindication of rights approach has been widely criticised as 
being inappropriate and consequently is seen as likely to be 
abandoned.13 Other policy issues such as deterrence and public 
interest have been advocated as more relevant considerations 
when determining the exclusion of evidence. 
2 Initial developments 
In the 1991 case of R v Kirifi.14 Cooke P stated that "where a 
plain breach of the right declared by Parliament has been 
established, it is a proper course for the Court to rule out an 
admission or confession obtained in consequence."15 Evidence 
1 1 R v Butcher, above nl. 
1 2 R v Goodwin, above n8, 267. Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act provides that no Court shall hold any other 
enactment to be repealed, revoked, invalid or ineffective by reason of that enactment being inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
1 3 See Richard Mahoney "Vindicating Rights: Excluding Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Bill of Rights" 
in Huscroft and Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 447,449 and Campbell 
Thomas Walker "Wilkes and Liberty: A Critique of the Prima Fade Exclusionary Rule" (1996) 17 NZULR 
69. 
1 4 R v Kirifi, above n7. 
1 5 R v Kirifi, above n7, 12. 
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obtained in consequence of a breach was to be excluded unless 
there were circumstances in the particular case that satisfied the 
Judge that it would be fair and right to admit the evidence. This 
principle differs significantly from the common law rule by 
reversing the presumptive admissibility of evidence and 
substituting a prima fade exclusionary rule. 
The principle set down in Kirifi was applied by the Court of 
Appeal a short time later in the case of R v Butcher.16 Cooke P 
elaborated on the rule, stating that the onus of convincing the 
Court that the evidence should be admitted notwithstanding the 
breach rested on the Crown.17 It was also decided that a trivial 
or inconsequential breach may not lead to the exclusion of 
evidence. IS 
3 Real and confessional evidence 
In Butcher the Court held that some of the real evidence obtained 
as a result of the breach of the appellants' rights was admissible. 
The evidence had been found when one of the accused had 
shown Police where it was hidden. The Court of Appeal held 
that the items would have been found without the breach 
because the Police would have made a thorough search and 
located the items one way or another. However, other pieces of 
physical evidence were not admissible because it was not likely 
that the Police would have found them without the help of the 
accused. 
1 6 R v Butcher, above nl. 
1 7 R v Butcher, above nl, 266. 
1 8 R v Butcher, above nl, 266. 
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The Court of Appeal has to date resisted making a distinction 
between the admissibility of real and confessional evidence. 
Such a distinction would likely be based on the concept that real 
evidence, being a tangible item, is able to be discovered 
regardless of a rights violation as in the Butcher case, whereas 
confessional evidence is unlikely to be otherwise obtained. The 
likelihood of a distinction being adopted by the New Zealand 
Courts is discussed below .19 
4 Circumstances where the rule does not apply 
Gault J made it clear in Butcher that he did not favour a strict 
prima fade exclusionary rule. He held that flexibility was 
necessary to ensure that the remedy was appropriate to the 
particular breach. 20 He went on to say21 -
I consider that the correct approach should be to 
exclude as a general rule evidence obtained by conduct 
clearly involving denial of the rights included in s23 
which can be said to have induced provision of the 
evidence in question. Where there is no clear breach, a 
purely technical breach or a breach which has not 
induced the provision of the evidence, exclusion should 
be in the discretion of the Court exercised on the basis 
of fairness and the interests of justice. 
It is significant that this formulation of the rule by Gault J is 
remarkably similar to that which the majority of the Court 
developed in later cases.22 
1 9 InPartV. 
2 0 R v Butcher, above nl, 272. 
2 1 R v Butcher, above nl, 273. 
2 2 See R v Jefferies [1994] l NZLR 290 (CA). 
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The cases of Ministry of Transport v Noort23 and R v Te Kira24 
established the "real and substantial connection" test. 
Richardson J (as he then was) held in Te Kira that there must be 
more than a "slender temporal link" between the violation and 
the obtaining of the evidence in order to exclude it.25 Anything 
less was deemed to be contrary to the statutory intent. The onus 
is on the Crown to prove that there was no real and substantial 
connection between the breach and the obtaining of the 
evidence. If the Crown cannot do so, it must prove that it would 
nonetheless be fair and right to admit the evidence. 26 
5 Good faith 
In R v Narayan27 the accused had not been advised of his right to 
consult a lawyer before making an inculpatory statement. The 
Court of Appeal held that there had been a serious breach of the 
Bill of Rights. In determining whether he should allow for police 
good faith and whether there were any circumstances that 
would justify admitting the evidence the Cooke P took into 
account the fact that the accused spoke little English and was in 
an alien country. Therefore, the rights provided by the Act were 
of special value to the accused and he should not be deprived of 
his rights "merely because the police acted in good faith."28 
The possibility of a "good faith" exception was discussed at 
2 3 Ministry of Transport v Noori [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA). 
2 4 R v Te Kira (1993] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). 
2 5 R v Te Kira, above n24, 272. 
2 6 R v Te Kira, above n24, 273. 
2 7 R v Narayan [1992] 3 NZLR 145 (CA). 
2 8 R v Narayan, above n27, 149. 
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length in the subsequent case of R v Goodwin.29 Cooke P made it 
clear that he did not support adopting such an exception, stating 
that to do so would mean that "ignorance of the law would 
become an excuse and the less an officer understood about a 
person's rights the less the law would protect those rights."30 
Hardie Boys J also warned against a good faith exception in 
Goodwin saying that it can rarely be relevant because it would 
place a premium on ignorance of the law.31 In addition, the 
Judge cautioned against consideration of the consequences of 
exclusion as he held that vind1cation of the right should be the 
overriding factor. However, it is significant to note that Hardie 
Boys J categorised the denial of rights in that case as 
unintentional and accidental and did not believe that vindication 
was necessary.32 
6 The future of the prima facie exclusionary rule 
By 1994 the prirna facie exclusionary rule was well settled in 
New Zealand rights jurisprudence. In summary, the rule stated 
that evidence obtained by a br.each of a person's rights was 
prirna facie inadmissible unless the Court was satisfied that there 
were circumstances that would justify admission. Cooke P in 
Goodwin outlined the circumstances that had been used to justify 
admission as follows33 -
2 9 R v Goodwin, above n8. 
3 0 R v Goodwin, above n8, 172. 
31 R v Goodwin, above n8, 202. 
3 2 R v Goodwin, above n8, 203. 
3 3 R v Goodwin, above n8, 171. 
waiver of rights by the person affected; 
inconsequentiality, in the sense that the Court can be 
satisfied that the admission would have been made 
without a breach; reasonably apprehended physical 
danger to the law enforcement officer or other persons; 
other reasons for urgency such as the risk of destruction 
of evidence; and the triviality of the breach if it is only a 
marginal departure from the individual's rights 
15 
Richardson J added to the list in the Te Kira case with the "real 
and substantial connection" test. 
In a decision that has evoked considerable academic comment, R 
v Grayson and Taylor,34 the Court of Appeal has stated that "on an 
appropriate occasion the Court would be prepared to re-examine 
the prima fade exclusion rule."35 That decision was delivered in 
1996 and to date the Court of Appeal has not taken the 
opportunity to revisit the rule, despite having had occasion to do 
so.36 
C Reasonableness 
Although not a part of the prirna fade exclusionary rule, the 
development of the reasonableness jurisprudence under s21 is 
very important to the rule. The reasonableness of an alleged 
breach of s21 must be determined before the rule itself becomes 
relevant. However, the interpretation and application of the 
term "unreasonable" have meant that the rule is being applied 
3 4 R v Grayson and Taylor, above n2. 
3 5 R v Grayson and Taylor, above n2, 412. 
3 6 See R v N (12 May 1999) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 26/99, 13. 
1 6 
less and less as the Court "moves the goal posts" to uphold 
police conduct.37 The Court of Appeal - particularly since the 
departure of President Cooke - has indicated its dissatisfaction 
with the rule and the reasonableness jurisprudence has become a 
means of avoiding the application of the rule in many cases. 
The Jefferies3B case was the first to accept that there may be cases 
where "for special reasons" an unlawful search may nevertheless 
be deemed to be a reasonable one.39 However, Cooke P 
cautioned that would be "a path down which a Court should 
surely be reluctant to go."40 McKay J made it very clear in this 
case that he believed that it could never be reasonable to 
"infringe the legal rights of others."41 
The Grayson case is very important in this context. This decision 
did not expressly overrule the previous cases, but it did 
significantly change the way that Bill of Rights cases, particularly 
challenges ·under section 21, will be approached.42 
The factors that had previously been excluded by the Court of 
Appeal when determining the application of the prima facie 
exclusionary rule were introduced at an earlier stage in the 
Grayson decision - at the point of determining whether the .search 
and seizure was "reasonable" in terms of section 21. The Grayson 
court also considered factors such as the "police officer's beliefs" 
which had previously been ruled as irrelevant in applying the 
3 7 Schwartz, above n6, 262. 
3 8 R v Jefferies, above n22. 
3 9 R v Jefferies, above n22. 
4 0 R v Jefferies, above n22, 296. 
4 1 R v Jefferies, above n22, 316. 
4 2 See Butler, above n6; Schwartz, above n6. 
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prima fade exclusionary rule even, ironically, in section 21 cases. 
In an unanimous judgment the Court held that what is unlawful 
is not necessarily unreasonable. The lawfulness of an action 
would always be highly relevant but not determinative.43 
The effect of the Grayson decision is that the Police can violate 
rights of an individual that are meant to be protected by the Bill 
of Rights, and their actions can still be seen as reasonable and not 
constituting a breach. The Grayson court also held that it was 
.relevant that "significant real evidence was found" during the 
illegal search. 
This interpretation diminishes the effectiveness of the Bill of 
Rights because the Courts are using the Act to validate unlawful 
Police behaviour. The prima fade exclusionary rule does not 
become an issue because there is no breach to remedy. 
It is clear that the Court of Appeal believe that there are now 
other remedies that may be more appropriate than the prima 
fade exclusionary rule. The Grayson Court commented on the 
issue of remedies as follows44 -
The remedies might, in the first place, relate to the trial 
itself. For example evidence might be rejected, with the· 
possible consequence of the prosecution failing, the 
penalty imposed might be reduced or there might be an 
appropriate order for costs. There is the possibility of 
police disciplinary proceedings, criminal prosecution, 
and civil proceedings. Proceedings brought by an 
aggrieved person might lead to damages or 
4 3 R v Grayson and Taylor, above n2, 407. 
4 4 R v Grayson and Taylor, above n2, 411. 
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compensation, a declaration, or future looking relief. 
III THE MOHAMMED CASE 
A Introduction 
The Mohammed case was decided by the Privy Council in 
December 1998 and concerned an appeal from the Court of 
Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. The appellant, Allie 
Mohammed ("Mohammed") had been convicted and sentenced 
to death on the strength of a confession obtained in breach of his 
right to a lawyer guaranteed by the Constitution. The appellant 
sought to have the unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
excluded. The Court of Appeal, exercising an overall fairness 
jurisdiction, declined to exclude. The appellant argued before 
the Privy Council that the Court of Appeal should have applied 
an automatic exclusionary rule of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence. 
The Privy Council held that a breach of the constitutional right to 
communicate with a lawyer is a "somewhat lesser right" than 
the right to a fair trial.45 The consequence of a breach .of the 
former right will not necessarily be exclusion of the evidence 
obtained. In other words, a prima facie exclusionary rule does 
not apply in Trinidad and Tobago. 
This decision may have important ramifications for the New 
Zealand prima facie exclusionary rule. Their Lordships 
explicitly considered the New Zealand rule and, despite saying 
4 5 Mohammed v The State, above n3. 
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that the decisions were "powerfully reasoned", declined to adopt 
it. Instead, their Lordships used a hierarchical rating of human 
rights to justify their refusal to vindicate the clear breaches of the 
appellant's rights. In addition, their Lordships incorrectly 
interpreted the Irish jurisprudence in support of their decision. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has already indicated that it 
is willing to revisit our exclusionary rule. The Mohammed case 
may be used as a justification by those who wish to move away 
from the current position in this country. If our Court does 
intend to revisit the rule based on the Privy Council's decision, it 
is vital that the implications of their Lordships' reasoning be 
considered. 
B The Facts of the Case 
On the evening of the murder a Police patrol car followed a 
vehicle driven by Mohammed to a lookout and saw a man 
(identified as Ali) transfer from Mohammed's car to another car. 
The occupants of the second car_ were known to the Police and 
they followed it away from the lookout but then lost the vehicle 
in traffic. A short time later and nearby, a drive-by sh?oting 
took place. An eye witness told Police that he had seen a 
particular vehicle drive past, shots were fired and the vehicle 
was then driven away. The vehicle was the same car that the 
Police had followed away from the lookout. 
Mohammed, aware that the Police wanted to speak to him, 
voluntarily went to the Police station the following day. He 
made a written statement to the effect that he had been driving 
his taxi the previous evening. Mohammed acknowledged that 
20 
he had been driving his vehicle about the time that the Police 
had allegedly seen him the night before. The next day the 
Inspector who had taken Mohammed's statement went to see 
him. The Inspector told Mohammed that the statement he had 
made was untrue and that he wanted the truth. Mohammed 
was cautioned but was not informed of his right to consult a 
lawyer. 
Mohammed then made a second statement to the Inspector. He 
admitted driving Ali to the lookout for a rendezvous with a 
hired gunman. He then waited for Ali nearby while "the deed 
was done" and drove him home afterwards. As it was clear 
from this statement that Mohammed was privy to the murder 
plan and had acted as the getaway driver, he was charged with 
murder. 
The prosecution conceded that the second statement made by 
Mohammed was obtained in breach of his constitutional rights. 
However, the trial judge made a finding of fact that the breach 
had occurred accidentally. 
At the trial, defence counsel declined to make a closing address 
to the jury. The Judge allowed the prosecutor to addr~ss the 
jury. The prosecutor urged the jury "in emotive language" to 
convict the defendant.46 The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and 
Tobago held that the address amounted to an irregularity, but 
that the result was inevitable once the second statement was 
admitted into evidence. 
4 6 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 557. 
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C The King Case 
Mohammed's counsel relied on the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Miranda v Arizona47 where it was held that confession 
evidence obtained in breach of the Constitution of the United 
States of America is inadmissible. 
This submission was acknowledged by counsel as being 
inconsistent with the earlier Privy Council judgment in King v 
The Queen48 decided under the Jamaican constitution. In the 
latter case, King was found to have been searched in a manner 
that breached his constitutional rights. Lord Hodson had held 
that it did not matter whether the right existed at common law or 
was enshrined in a written form; the discretion of the Court 
remained and must be exercised. 49 
Mohammed's counsel sought to distinguish King on the basis 
that the case dealt with real evidence not confessional evidence 
and therefore should not be applied. Their Lordships held that 
King was "highly material" as Lord Hodson had cited authorities 
that concerned the admissibility of confession evidence.SO King 
was deemed "weighty authority for the proposition that in such 
a case a judge has a discretion to exclude or admit the 
confession." 51 
However, the part of the decision in King relating to the 
significance of enshrined rights was held to be too narrow and 
4 7 Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436. 
4 8 King v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 304 (PC). 
4 9 King v The Queen, above n48, 319. 
5 0 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 560. 
51 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 560. 
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no longer good law. Their Lordships held that the incorporation 
of rights in a Constitution is "not meaningless: it is clear 
testimony that an added value is attached to the protection of the 
right."52 
D Miranda v Arizona 
The Privy Council declined to adopt the Miranda argument 
stating that "such an absolute rule does not easily fit into a 
system based on English criminal procedure."53 The Court 
maintained that at the time that the Constitution of Trinidad and 
Tobago was enacted the common law provided a judicial 
discretion to admit or exclude a confession obtained in breach of 
the Judges' Rules. 
Their Lordships found that when framing the Constitution of 
Trinidad and Tobago "the legislature was not writing on a blank 
sheet".54 The Privy Council went on to say that although such 
rights are fundamental it does not follow that they can only be 
protected by an absolute exclusionary rule such as that found in 
the Miranda decision. 
In effect their Lordships were saying that the Constitution of 
Trinidad and Tobago did not replace the common law nor 
abolish it: it simply recognised the existence and importance of 
the rights. The Constitution stands alongside the common law 
and basically replicates it. In comparison, the Bill of Rights 
5 2 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 562. 
5 3 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 560. 
5 4 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 560. 
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contained in the Constitution of the United States of America 
replaced the common law. 
E The Prima Facie Exclusionary Rule 
In the alternative, Mohammed's counsel argued that if Miranda 
was not followed then a prima facie exclusionary rule should 
apply. Without such a rule, it was submitted, little or no value 
would be given to the rights protected by the Constitution. Case 
law from three jurisdictions, Ireland, New Zealand and Canada, 
was relied upon by counsel. 
1 Irish Case Law 
Their Lordships referred to the cases of Lynch, O'Brien and 
Kenny.SS They stated that "the Irish decisions do not establish a 
general prima facie rule against admitting confessions obtained 
in breach of a constitutional right."S6 
In fact, it is clear from the Supreme Court of Ireland decisions 
that Irish case law does establish a prima facie exclusionary rule. 
The exclusionary rule developed by the Supreme Court of 
' , 
Ireland is to the effect that evidence obtained by a "deliberate 
and conscious violation" of a person's constitutional rights is 
inadmissible except in "extraordinary excusing circumstances".S7 
5 5 The People (Attorney-General) v O'Brien [1965] IR 142 (SC); The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v 
Kenny [1990] 2 IR 110 (SC); The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Lynch [1982] IR 64 (SC). 
5 6 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 561. 
5 7 The People (Attorney-General) v O'Brien, above n55. 
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The phrase "deliberate and conscious" breach or violation was 
explained by O'Hanlon J as follows58 -
... knowledge of the common law and statute law, and 
of the constitutional guarantees, must - generally 
speaking - be imputed to the law enforcement agencies, 
and if they are breached in a manner which infringes 
the constitutional rights of an accused person, it may be 
regarded as a deliberate and conscious violation 
without regard to the actual state of knowledge or bona 
£ides of the garda officer or other person committing 
such violation. 
The cases of O'Brien and Kenny illustrate the rule. In O'Brien the 
police had applied for and been granted a search warrant which 
they duly executed, resulting in the seizure of real evidence. 
Through an administrative error, the incorrect address was put 
on the warrant documentation. The Supreme Court held that the 
warrant was unlawful but went on to hold that there had not 
been a breach of the accused's constitutional rights. The officer 
concerned was unaware of the error and therefore there had not 
been a deliberate and conscious violation of the constitution. 
The admissibility of the evidence could be dealt with pursuant to 
the fairness principles of the common law. 
In Kenny the police officer had followed a long standing 
procedure in obtaining a search warrant. The warrant was 
executed and evidence seized. The warrant was held to be 
unlawful as the peace commissioner (the Irish equivalent of a 
Justice of the Peace), when determining the application, had 
relied solely on the suspicion of the police officer and had not 
5 8 The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Kenny, above n55, 119. 
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made the required inquiries as to the basis of that suspicion. 
Despite accepting that the officers involved were acting pursuant 
to the warrant and had no knowledge that they were invading 
the constitutional rights of the accused, the Supreme Court held 
that there had been a deliberate and conscious violation of the 
constitution as defined by O'Hanlon Jin the quote above. The 
evidence was excluded. 
Interestingly, the rule in Ireland is, like the New Zealand prima 
facie exclusionary rule, based on the vindication of rights. This 
is clear from various decisions, but in particular that of O'Brien 
where WalshJ stated59 -
The defence and vindication of the constitutional rights 
of the citizen is a duty superior to that of trying such 
citizen for a criminal offence. The Courts ... must 
recognise the paramount position of constitutional 
rights ... 
This statement reflects the New Zealand position as discussed 
above. Both jurisdictions have developed stronger rules to give 
effect to protected rights. 
2 Canadian Case Law 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms differs 
significantly from the constitutional legislation of other 
jurisdictions because its remedies provision explicitly enacts a 
specific principle for exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence. Section 24(2) of the Charter provides that evidence 
obtained in breach of the Charter is inadmissible when 
5 9 The People (Attorney-General) v O'Brien, above nSS, 170. 
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admission would "bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute". It has been held by the Supreme Court of Canada 
that evidence obtained in breach of a person's right to consult a 
lawyer is inadmissible.60 
The Privy Council effectively dismissed the Canadian 
jurisprudence because the Charter provides an express provision 
to deal with the breach of a constitutional right.61 There is no 
further examination of the Canadian case law or its possible 
application to the breach of the appellant's rights. 
3 New Zealand Case Law 
The New Zealand decisions were deemed to be "the most 
directly relevant" even though our Bill of Rights does not have 
the constitutional standing of the rights law of the other 
jurisdictions.62 Their Lordships summarised the New Zealand 
position as "that only such a prima facie exclusionary rule gives 
proper effect to the constitutionality of the particular 
provision."63 
Despite stating that the decisions were "powerfully reasoned" 
their Lordships did not adopt the New Zealand view.64 They 
simply said that they had reached a view that "does not e~tirely 
accord with the view which has prevailed in New Zealand."65 
Their Lordships did not provide any reasons for not following 
6 0 Collins v The Queen (1987) 33 CCC 3d 1. 
6 1 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 561. 
6 2 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 561. 
6 3 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 562. 
6 4 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 562. 
6 5 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 562. 
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the New Zealand developments. 
F The Privy Council's Approach 
Their Lordships decided that there is a two step process to be 
followed. Firstly, the facts relating to the alleged breach must be 
determined. If there is any dispute the burden of proof rests on 
. the prosecution. Secondly, the Judge's . discretion must be 
exercised. Their Lordships followed the King balancing exercise 
- the Judge must weigh the interests of the community in 
securing the evidence against the interests of the individual 
whose rights have been infringed. This second step mirrors 
Richardson P' s thesis developed in Bill of Rights cases in the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal.66 
Their Lordships stated that the nature of the particular 
constitutional guarantee and the nature of the particular right 
had to be considered. A breach of an individual's right to a fair 
trial "must inevitably result in the conviction being quashed."67 
However the breach of a person's right to consult a lawyer was 
deemed to be a "somewhat lesser right" and a breach would not 
necessarily result in a confession being excluded. 
The Mohammed decision goes on to state that "a breach of a 
constitutional right is a cogent factor militating in favour of the 
exclusion of the confession" and that "it would generally not be 
right to admit a confession where the police have deliberately 
6 6 Richardson, above nlO. 
6 7 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 562. 
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frustrated a suspect's constitutional rights."68 
The Privy Council held that the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and 
Tobago had correctly upheld the admission of the second 
statement into evidence. Their Lordships do not attempt to 
justify their decision, nor do they outline the balancing exercise 
undertaken. Despite a relatively long passage on the 
"fundamental importance" of the fact that the people of Trinidad 
and Tobago attached sufficient significance to the right to want it 
enshrined in a Constitution, their Lordships held that this 
particular right in these circumstances was not important 
enough to exclude Mohammed's confession. It appears to be 
extremely relevant that the police acted in good faith. 69 
The Privy Council did however, quash the appellant's murder 
conviction. This decision had nothing to do with the breach of 
his constitutional rights, but was a direct result of the 
prosecutor's address to the jury. Their Lordships could not be 
satisfied that, without the speech, the jury would have convicted 
the appellant. 
G Analysis of the Privy Council Decision 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal should not adopt the decision 
of the Privy Council in Mohammed. To do so would be contrary 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the 
Covenant") to which we are a signatory. The decision is not well 
reasoned and the analysis of the Irish jurisprudence is flawed. 
6 8 Mohammed v The·State, above n3, 562-563. 
6 9 Mohammed v The State, above n3, 563. 
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The Privy Council in the Mohammed case seem to want to isolate 
the New Zealand case law on the basis that it is unique. It is 
clear that our prima fade exclusionary rule is not unusual but is 
in fact parallel to the Irish rule. In addition, their Lordships are 
incorrect in their statement that Irish decisions do not establish a 
general prima fade rule - they clearly do. The Irish rule may, in 
fact, be stricter than its New Zealand equivalent as our Court of 
Appeal has introduced more exceptions to justify admission. 
The Irish courts continue to use the term "extraordinary 
excusing circumstances" and have kept exceptions to a 
minimum. 
The decision in the O'Brien case would have been different had 
there been a breach of the constitution - the much stronger 
exclusionary rule would have been applied in recognition of the 
importance of the accused's rights. This case is similar to the 
New Zealand case of R v Faasipa where the taking of a blood 
sample was held to be unlawful but not in breach of the Bill of 
Rights.70 Had there been a finding that the accused's rights had 
been violated the prima fade exclusionary rule would have 
applied. 
Their Lordships quote at pages 561 to 562, from the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal decision in R v Te Kira 71 where Hardie 
Boys J stated 72 
Often the only effective way in which the Court can 
affirm the right is by refusing to recognise or to give 
effect to what has resulted from it. That may mean 
7 0 R v Faasipa (1995) 2 HRNZ 50 (CA) . 
71 R v Te Kira, above n24. 
7 2 R v Te Kira, above n24. 
C 
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rejection or exclusion of a confessional statement ... 
[H]ad the police observed the law the evidence would 
not have been obtained anyway. 
Without the second statement made by Mohammed the 
prosecution case was extremely weak. The three men who 
allegedly carried out the shooting had been acquitted after a 
Judge directed that there was no case to answer. The 
prosecution case against Mohammed rested on the second 
statement. It is highly likely that Mohammed would never have 
made the second statement had he been advised that to do so 
could result in him being charged with murder rather than a 
lesser offence. 
Using the New Zealand exclusionary rule the second statement 
made by Mohammed would have been excluded. The breach 
was certainly not inconsequential and there was a direct link 
between the breach and the obtaining of the evidence. As 
already discussed, the evidence would not have come to light in 
any other way. 
The Privy Council did not exclude Mohammed's second 
statement because it deemed the right to counsel to be a lesser 
right than that of a fair trial. The Covenant refers to the ~'equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" and 
does not provide for any rights to be more or less important. 
Their Lordships have adopted a hierarchical structure of rights 
to support their decision and this is in direct contrast to the 
Covenant. In addition, New Zealand courts have accepted that a 
breach of the right to consult a lawyer is sufficient to justify 
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exclusion of evidence.73 
The right to consult a lawyer is, of course, connected to the 
fundamental right of an individual against self-incrimination. 
The consequences of not having legal advice can be enormous as 
they were in the present case. If a serious breach such as the one 
in the present case is not sufficient to exclude the resulting 
evidence, it is difficult to imagine a case that would justify 
exclusion. 
H The Implications for New Zealand 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal is not bound by the Privy 
Council's decision in this case. The decision is, however, highly 
persuasive. It is likely that the decision will be used to develop 
the good faith exception in this country, but will not be adopted 
in support of treating real and confessional evidence in the same 
way. 
1 A Good Faith Exception 
In most cases a breach will have a significant effect regardless of 
whether it was unintentional or deliberate. The effect of the 
breach in Mohammed was not lessened by the fact that the police 
were found not to have deliberately infringed the appellant's 
rights. The fact is, Mohammed's rights were breached and the 
effect of that breach was catastrophic for him. If the prosecutor 
had not been incorrectly permitted to make a closing speech to 
the jury Mohammed would have been sentenced to death. 
7 3 Ministry of Transport v Noort, above n23. 
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Their Lordships have effectively embraced a "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule. New Zealand courts have 
expressly refused to adopt such an exception. In R v Goodwin 74 
President Cooke, as he then was, recognised the danger inherent 
in accepting a good faith exception, stating that "Bill of Rights 
Act violations do not depend on a kind of mens rea on the part 
of the officer. Otherwise ignorance of the law would become an 
excuse and the less an officer understood about a person's rights 
the less the law would protect those rights."75 
The Grayson decision introduced the good faith issue as one of 
the factors to be considered when determining the 
reasonableness of a search in terms of section 21 of the Bill of 
Rights. This development echoes Richardson J' s judgment in R v 
Jefferies (dissenting on this point).76 It is likely, given the makeup 
of the current Court of Appeal, that New Zealand will adopt a 
good faith exception to the prima facie exclusionary rule when it 
"re-examines" the rule. The decision in Mohammed will only 
strengthen the President's clear preference for such an exception. 
It is significant that Irish jurisprudence provides a different 
interpretation of the good faith exception. Under Irish 
jurisprudence the law enforcement agencies are impute1 with 
knowledge of the legislation and common law, and a breach of a 
person's constitutional rights will be deemed a conscious and 
deliberate violation. This approach does not allow a 
consideration of the Police officer's actual state of knowledge or 
his intentions. This is illustrated by the Kenny case, discussed 
7 4 R v Goodwin, above n8. 
7 5 R v Goodwin, above n8, 172. 
7 6 R v Jefferies, above n22. 
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above, where a search pursuant to what Police believed was a 
valid warrant, was held to be a deliberate and conscious breach 
because of the way that the warrant was issued. The Police in 
fact acted completely in good faith but were still deemed to have 
deliberately breached the defendant's rights. 
2 A Distinction Between Real and Confessional Evidence 
The New Zealand cases cited in Mohammed are concerned only 
with confessional evidence. Our Court of 'Appeal has not yet 
formally embraced a distinction between the admissibility of real 
and confessional evidence obtained by breach. The Grayson 
decision indicates that this issue may also be revisited. The 
Court states that "whether there should be the same response to 
breaches of rights in the course of activities resulting in the 
discovery of real evidence as to breaches of rights in the course 
of obtaining, for example, confessional evidence also requires 
careful consideration."77 
Post-Grayson cases have further indicated that the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal favours a distinction. Richardson P in R v 
Hooker 78 states that Grayson related to "the admission of physical 
evidence."79 In the more recent case of R v H Elias J for the 
Court of Appeal, when determining the admissibility of real 
evidence, stated "the evidence obtained was real evidence which 
... does not conscript the accused against himself in the nature of 
confessional statements."80 In a judgment delivered by the 
Court of Appeal in May of this year, one of the factors taken into 
7 7 R v Grayson and Taylor, above n2, 412. 
7 8 R v Hooker (16 June 1997) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 163/97. 
7 9 R v Hooker, above n78, 4. 
8 0 R v H (15 March 1999) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 411/98. 
34 
account when deciding upon the admissibility of real evidence 
was that the evidence was non-confessional. 81 
Irish case law does not distinguish between real and confession 
evidence. The O'Brien 82 case which is followed in both Kenny 
and Lynch concerned real evidence. In Lynch O'Higgins CJ 
stated that he could not see anything in the O'Brien case "which 
confines or should confine the principles there enunciated to 
property or 'real evidence"'.83 The Chief Justice went on to say 
that84 
even if the O'Brien case did not effectively decide that 
statements obtained as a consequence of a deliberate 
and conscious violation of the constitutional rights of an 
accused should be excluded except in the circumstances 
mentioned, it seems to me that such a proposition must 
be accepted. 
IV THE IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE RULE 
A Introduction 
The Law Commission is an independent and publicly f~ded 
statutory body created to review and reform the laws of New 
Zealand.85 The work of the Law Commission is becoming 
increasingly more important and the Courts are taking more 
8 1 R u N, above n36, 13. 
8 2 The People (Attorney-General) u O'Brien, above n55. 
8 3 The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) u Lynch, above n55, 78. 
8 4 The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) u Lynch, above n55, 78. 
8 5 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence: NZLC R55 Volume 2 (Wellington, 1999). Law Commission act 
1985. 
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judicial notice of the Commission's proposals for reform. 
The Law Commission has proposed major reform to our 
evidence laws in the recently released Evidence Code.86 The 
Commission proposes to replace the prima facie evidence rule 
with the "improperly obtained evidence rule" contained in 
section 29 of the Code. This rule is also intended to abrogate the 
common law fairness discretion.87 
The Court of Appeal may choose to informally adopt the rule as 
it allows for more judicial discretion than does the current prima 
facie exclusionary rule. Such a rule would find favour with 
many members of the bench. Alternatively, the Court may leave 
it to Parliament to enact the improperly obtained evidence rule 
as part of a reform of the evidence legislation. 
It is important that the improperly obtained evidence rule is 
examined in the context of the prima facie exclusionary rule and 
the implications for New Zealand's rights jurisprudence. 
B The Law Commission's rule 
The improperly obtained evidence rule provides as follows -
Section 29 
(1) The improperly obtained evidence rule in 
subsection (3) applies to evidence offered by the 
prosecution in a criminal proceeding only if 
(a) the defendant, or a co-defendant against 
8 6 New Zealand Law Commission, above n85. 
8 7 New Zealand Law Commission, above n85, 85. 
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whom the evidence is offered, raises an 
issue of whether the evidence was 
improperly obtained and informs the 
judge and the prosecution of the grounds 
for raising the issue; or 
(b) the judge raises an issue of whether the 
evidence was improperly obtained and 
informs the prosecution of the grounds 
for raising the issue. 
(2) If the defendant, a co-defendant or the judge 
raises the issue of whether the evidence was 
improperly obtained, the improperly obtained 
evidence rule applies unless the prosecution 
satisfies the judge on the balance of probabilities 
that the evidence was not improperly obtained. 
(3) Improperly obtained evidence offered by the 
prosecution in a criminal proceeding is 
inadmissible unless the judge considers that the 
exclusion of the evidence would be contrary to 
the interests of justice. 
( 4) Evidence is improperly obtained if it is obtained 
(a) in consequence of a breach of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; or 
(b) in consequence of a breach of any : 
enactment or rule of law; or 
(c) in consequence of a statement made by a 
defendant that is or would be 
inadmissible if it were offered in 
evidence by the prosecution; or 
(d) unfairly. 
(5) In exercising the power to admit evidence under 
subsection (3), the judge must consider, among 
other relevant matters, 
(a) the significance of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 as an Act to affirm, 
protect and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in New Zealand, 
and 
(b) the nature and gravity of any 
impropriety, and 
(c) whether any impropriety was the result 
of bad faith, and 
(d) whether the evidence existed and would 
have been discovered or otherwise 
obtained regardless of any impropriety. 
(6) A statement made by a defendant that is 
inadmissible because of section 27 (the reliability 
rule) or section 28 (the oppression rule) cannot 
be admitted as evidence under subsection (3) of 
this section. 
1 When would the Improperly Obtained Evidence Rule Apply? 
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The prosecution must intend to offer the evidence in a criminal 
proceeding and the defendant, or co-defendant against whom 
the evidence is intended to be used, or the presiding judge must 
raise the issue of whether the evidence has been imprc;>perly 
obtained. The person raising the issue must advise their 
grounds for doing so. 
This procedure is the same under our current laws. However, 
the Code also allows a co-defendant or the Court to raise the 
issue of admissibility. At present, the defendant advises the 
prosecution before trial that he does not accept the evidence and 
the prosecution must then file a notice to alert the court of the 
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challenge to the evidence. A voir dire hearing is then held to 
determine the admissibility of the evidence. Presumably this 
procedure would remain the same if the Code was adopted. 
The next step is to consider whether the evidence has been 
improperly obtained. The proposed subsection (4) outlines 
when evidence is deemed to have been improperly obtained and 
includes when it is obtained in consequence of a breach of the 
Bill of Rights Act. This section of the paper will concentrate on 
this type of improperly obtained evidence. 
At this stage, the determination of this issue would proceed as it 
does under current law. The Judge must decide whether there 
has been a breach of the Bill of Rights Act, and would do so 
based on the principles established by the Courts to date. 
The improperly obtained evidence rule can only be considered 
once it is established that the evidence has been obtained as 
detailed in subsection (4). The burden of proof is on the 
prosecution to show, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
evidence was not improperly obtained. 
As discussed above in Part II, the difficulty with the current 
method of determining a breach of the Bill of Rights is the 
interpretation that the Court of Appeal has placed on s21. As a 
result of the Grayson case, the reasonableness test is likely to 
preclude many otherwise clear breaches of the Act from being 
accepted as breaches by New Zealand courts. The Law 
Commission's rule would therefore not be invoked to exclude 
real evidence, whether in the interests of justice or not. 
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2 The Interests of Justice 
If a breach is accepted, the evidence obtained as a result is 
deemed to be improperly obtained. The evidence is then prima 
facie inadmissible unless the Court considers exclusion to be 
contrary to the interests of justice. This term is not defined but a 
list of matters that the Court must consider is included in 
subsection (5). In their commentary to the Code, the 
Commission states that a "factual and policy judgment" is called 
for and the judge must balance "various public interests" which 
extend beyond those in the particular case to those concerning 
the general administration of the law.SB The Commission further 
states that the section does not require a rigid or technical 
approach.89 
In respect of the factors to be considered by the judge, the 
Commission asserts that all are interdependent and the 
importance placed on each will depend on the facts of each case. 
(a) The significance of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 as ari. Act to affirm, protect and promote 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in New 
Zealand 
The New Zealand Courts have done a lot to emphasise the 
significance of our Bill of Rights Act, particularly as it is not 
entrenched legislation. As is discussed below, the Court of 
Appeal has created remedies to give effect to the Act's 
provisions in recognition of our responsibilities under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
8 8 New Zealand Law Commission, above n85, 85. 
8 9 New Zealand Law Commission, above n85, 85. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This consideration in 
itself should not pose any difficulties. However, the New 
Zealand Courts have never explicitly denied the importance of 
the Bill of Rights Act but they have discovered ways of denying 
its application. 
(b) The nature and gravity of any impropriety 
This would involve a consideration of the behaviour of the Police 
in obtaining the evidence. Issues such as the inconsequentiality 
or triviality of the breach, or a reasonably apprehended physical 
danger to the officer or any other person would be relevant.90 
The intent of the Police will be discussed in the next paragraph 
as it is inextricably linked. 
( c) Whether any impropriety was the result of bad 
faith 
This is effectively the good faith exception that Cooke P warned 
against many years ago, and which has been introduced by the 
Court of Appeal when determining reasonableness under s21. A 
breach of s21 of the Bill of Rights that was actually deemed to be 
unreasonable could be saved (from the prosecution's point of 
view) by this section. This consideration has been included so 
that some good faith actions can protect admissibility of 
evidence by deeming exclusion to be contrary to the interests of 
justice. With the make up of our Court of Appeal it is not hard 
to imagine situations that would be covered by this section. 
9 0 These are some of the current exceptions to the prima facie exclusionary rule. See R v Goodwin, above n8. 
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( d) Whether the evidence existed and would have been 
discovered or otherwise obtained regardless of any 
impropriety 
The issue becomes whether, if the Police had not violated the 
defendant's rights, they would have discovered the evidence 
anyway. This will have to be determined on a case by case basis 
as each has its own particular facts. There will be cases where it 
is clear that the evidence would not have been obtained without 
the breach, and equally there will be cases where the evidence 
may have been obtained anyway. However, it is important that 
the defendant receives the benefit of any doubt. 
This consideration also creates a split between real and 
confessional evidence. This issue is discussed in Part V below. 
This factor was considered in the Butcher case and resulted in 
some evidence being excluded and the remainder admitted on 
the basis that it would have been found by the Police. 
(e) Other relevant matters 
The court must give consideration to the four matters 01:1tlined 
above "among other relevant matters." This term could involve 
things such as a waiver of rights by the affected person; the risk 
of destruction of evidence; lack of connection between the breach 
and the evidence obtained (the "real and substantial connection 
test" formulated in Te Kira) and other matters specific to 
particular cases such as the fact that the defendant did not speak 
English.91 
9 1 R v Narayan, above n27. 
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C Conclusion 
The improperly obtained evidence rule enables the presiding 
judge to take into account any considerations that he or she 
deems relevant to the particular case, and directs that the court 
must consider four matters. The latter includes factors that have 
expressly been excluded by New Zealand courts when 
considering breaches of the Bill of Rights, such as the intentions 
of the Police officer involved at the time of the rights violation. 
The Commission's rule gives the presiding judge more scope 
when considering whether evidence that meets the criteria of 
"improperly obtained evidence" should be excluded, than does 
the prima facie exclusionary rule. The Courts have, to date, 
disallowed the consideration of a number of factors. Pursuant to 
the Commission's rule the judge is able to take any matter into 
account, and he or she decides the weight to be given to each 
factor. 
Pursuant to section 7 of the Law Commission's Evidence Code, 
the "fundamental principle" in evidence law is that relevant 
evidence is admissible.92 The Code considers the admissibility 
of evidence from the wrong angle; the admissibility of evidence 
should be grounded in the protection of human rights. To 
premise the consideration of evidence on its relevance detracts 
from the effectiveness of the remedy for breach. 
9 2 New Zealand Law Commission, above n85, 31. 
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V EFFECTIVENESS 
A Introduction 
The touchstone, or measure, of the remedy for a violation of a 
protected right should be its effectiveness. Other considerations 
should be irrelevant as the protection of human rights is the only 
basis upon which the remedy should be postulated. 
In the Grayson decision the Court of Appeal noted the possible 
alternatives to the prima facie exclusionary rule and expressly 
included police disciplinary proceedings and civil actions. At 
present in New Zealand, the Police Complaints Authority is 
responsible for investigating police behaviour and 
recommending disciplinary action. The strength of this 
institution as an alternative to the rule will be discussed in this 
section as will the effectiveness of the civil proceedings available 
in New Zealand. 
B The Police Complaints Authority 
The Police Complaints Authority ("the PCA" or "the Auth?rity") 
is a single person who is appointed by the Governor Gener.al and 
who is responsible to Parliament.93 The PCA was created by the 
Police Complaints Authority Act 1988 ("the PCA Act") to 
provide an independent body to investigate complaints against 
the Police. 
For those who believe that deterrence is a principal justification 
9 3 There is also a Deputy PCA who is appointed under s8 of the Police Complaints Authority Act 1988. 
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for the existence of the prima fade exclusionary rule, the PCA 
may be seen as a suitable alternative to the exclusion of evidence. 
If an officer has acted improperly the PCA can investigate and, if 
the complaint is sustained, can recommend suitable punishment. 
In theory at least, this punishment should act as a deterrent to 
other officers. 
However, in his "Five Year Review" published in the 1996 
Annual Report, the then Authority effectively declared that he 
was not having a deterrent effect.94 At page 13 he states -
The first proposition I advance of the failure of the PCA 
in New Zealand has been to make the breakthrough to 
what I call a real impact on Police, which I will explain. 
From the beginning, of the PCA by statute in 1988 the 
Police department has come from firm opposition to 
our establishment, through to benign tolerance, and 
onto acceptance of the PCA's value, but has remained 
resistant to its real impact. By real impact I mean when 
the Police of their own volition are prepared to take the 
results of complaints against themselves for 
misconduct and neglect of duty, and investigations of 
incidents, as a resource for education and management 
of the service. 
Another difficulty with the PCA is the public perception of its 
effectiveness. Although the Authority is a Crown Entity 
"entirely independent of the Police service", most investigations 
are carried out by Police investigators.95 Every investigation is 
reviewed by the Authority (or his staff) but nonetheless the 
9 4 Police Complaints Authority "Police Complaints Authority Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 
1996" (1996] AJHR G51. 
9 5 Police Complaints Authority, above n94, 19 - 20. 
45 
public perceive the PCA as being biased in favour of the Police. 
The involvement of the Police in looking into complaints 
derogates from the independence of the Authority, and the 
public see it as the Police looking after their own. 
There are advantages to the PCA. It does not cost anything to 
make a complaint and have it investigated. Anyone can make a 
complaint to the Authority alleging misconduct or neglect of 
duty by a Police officer, or concerning any practice, policy or 
procedure of the Police.96 However, the Authority does have a 
discretion to take no action in respect of a complaint.97 
What the Authority once described as "civilian to Police officer 
interface" is characterised as the "bread and butter" of the PCA. 
98 In the year ended 30 June 1996 the Authority received 2,635 
complaints of which only 93 were s13 notifications.99 It is not 
possible to determine from the PCA statistics how many (if any) 
of these complaints related to alleged Bill of Rights violations.100 
A further and significant problem with the PCA is the lack of 
information on what action was recommended and whether it 
was followed through. There are no statistics detailing what 
punishments were recommended as a result of sustained 
complaints. The Authority has the power to recommend 
9 6 Police Complaints Authority Act 1988, s12(1). 
9 7 Police Complaints Authority Act 1988, s18. 
9 8 Police Complaints Authority, above n94, 7. 
9 9 Section 13 provides that the Commissioner of Police must advise the PCA (in writing) if a member of the 
Police, whilst acting in the execution of his or her duty, causes or appears to cause death or serious bodily 
harm to any person. 
1 0 0 In response to an enquiry under the Official Information Act, Judge Borrin the Deputy PCA advised that 
the Authority does not investigate Bill of Rights complaints unless they come up in the course of an 
enquiry. There are no records that identify such reports as including a Bill of Rights issue. Judge Borrin 
advised that the Authority usually leaves such issues to the Courts. 
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disciplinary action or that criminal proceedings be instituted.101 
However, it is the public's perception that the Police are left to 
discipline their own and this is seen as ineffectual. In addition, 
there is no right of appeal from the Authority's decision - an 
issue that the Authority has itself raised for consideration by 
Parliament.102 
In conclusion, until such time as the PCA is perceived to be an 
effective and independent investigator of the Police service, it is 
not a viable alternative to the exclusion of improperly obtained 
evidence. A possible solution is to amend the PCA Act to 
include a provision that the Authority must investigate all 
alleged breaches of the Bill of Rights Act, and must not delegate 
the investigation to a member of the Police. 
C Civil Proceedings 
In the case of Simpson v Attorney General ("Baigent's case") the 
Court of Appeal held that there was a public law remedy 
available for breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.103 
The Act does not itself provide a remedy for breaches. of its 
provisions and the Court relied upon the obligations imposed on 
New Zealand pursuant to the Covenant. New Zealand ratified 
the Covenant in 1978, and the Bill of Rights is stated as affirming 
and promoting our commitment to the Covenant. 
1 0 1 Police Complaints Authority Act 1988, s28. 
1 0 2 Police Complaints Authority, above n94, 17. 
103 Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's Case] (1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
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Article 2(3) of the Covenant states that each State Party 
undertakes the following -
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall 
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a 
remedy shall have his right thereto determined 
by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall 
enforce such remedies when granted. 
(Emphasis added) 
It is the words emphasised above that the Court of Appeal relied 
on in finding a public law remedy, with Casey J stating that 
Parliament cannot have intended there to be no remedy for those 
whose rights had been infringed.104 To accept that Parliament 
did so intend would be to regard the Act as "legislative window 
dressing" .10s 
In support of this argument is the development in the criminal 
jurisdiction of the prima facie exclusionary rule. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("the Declaration") 
is also relevant and was discussed by Hardie Boys Jin Baigent's 
1 0 4 Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's Case], above n103, 691. 
1 0 5 Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's Case], above n103, 691 . 
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case. Article 8 of the Declaration states that everyone has the 
right to an effective remedy for acts that violate fundamental 
rights granted by constitution or law. 
In holding that this remedy is a public law action rather than a 
private action in the nature of a tort claim, the Court ensured 
that the Crown immunity contained in the Crown Proceedings 
Act 1950 cannot be invoked. 
1 The Cost of Civil Proceedings 
In any proceedings filed against the state there is a large 
financial cost to the applicant. With the recent tightening of legal 
aid, it will be extremely difficult for plaintiffs to gain assistance 
from the Legal Services Board. A certificate of success has 
always been required when applying for aid, but this 
requirement will now be strictly enforced. The chances of 
success are discussed below. 
If the applicant has been denied the assistance of the prima facie 
exclusionary rule and has been convicted and imprisoned, he or 
she will find it near impossible to finance a civil claim, 
particularly if denied legal aid. 
2 The Onus of Proof 
In any civil proceedings the onus of proof is on the plaintiff. He 
or she must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there has 
been a breach of the Bill of Rights. In contrast, in the criminal 
jurisdiction the onus is on the Crown to show that there has not 
been a breach, or that if there was a breach, the evidence was not 
obtained as a result of it. 
49 
If the current judicial trend continues, it is unlikely that many 
breaches will be held to be unreasonable in the criminal 
jurisdiction. In the civil jurisdiction, the onus of proof moves 
onto the plaintiff and it will be extremely difficult for an 
individual to prove that the Police acted in breach of his or her 
rights. 
3 Judge or Jury? 
The Court of Appeal made it clear in Baigent's case that any civil 
proceeding under the Bill of Rights Act is likely to be heard by a 
Judge alone. Cooke P held that any compensation for breach 
was not pecuniary damages in terms of the Judicature Act 1908 
and that therefore there is no prima fade right to trial by jury 
although the judicial discretion to permit a jury trial remains.106 
Cooke P went on to say107 -
One would not expect jury trial to be commonly 
ordered in Bill of Rights cases. Generally speaking and 
in accordance with international tendencies these cases 
will be more appropriately dealt with by Judges. 
Casey J concurred with the President, holding that the selection 
of the remedy which would best vindicate the infringed right is 
best left to a Judge to decide rather than a jury.108 
The advantage of a jury trial for a person whose rights have been 
violated, is that it is possible that his peers may be more willing 
1 0 6 Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's Case], above n103, 678. 
1 0 7 Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's Case], above n103, 678. 
1 0 8 Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's Case], above n103, 692. 
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to compensate him for a breach of his rights by the Police. On 
the other hand, many commentators believe that there is less 
likelihood of such an advantage because of the attitude of society 
to convicted criminals.109 This attitude would also probably 
apply to a person who had escaped a criminal conviction 
because the evidence was excluded, as society's perception is 
that he was guilty but was acquitted on a technicality. 
4 Are Compensation and Damages an Effective Remedy? 
Despite the hurdles outlined above, there may be cases that 
succeed in the civil jurisdiction. It is yet to be seen what kinds of 
awards will be made by New Zealand courts. Cooke P made it 
clear in Baigent's case that "extravagant awards are to be 
avoided"llO and the likelihood of a Judge alone trial will 
probably ensure conservative awards. 
Compensation and/ or damages provide monetary relief to a 
person whose rights have been violated by the State. Financial 
gains are unlikely to vindicate the rights of such a person and 
certainly do not provide restitution. If the victim of a breach has 
already been through a criminal trial where improperly obtained 
evidence has been admitted, and they have been convict~d as a 
result, they would have lost more than anything that money can 
compensate for. They would have received a conviction which 
will be entered against their name and which they will have to 
disclose to various people and institutions in the future. They 
may have lost their liberty for a period of time. Compensation 
may make up for a loss of earnings but it cannot replace all of the 
1 0 9 See Walker, above n13; Bernard Robertson "Police Questioning" (1999) 5 HRLP 52. 
11 0 Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's Case), above nl03, 678. 
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non-financial things that have been lost. 
The strongest argument against the adoption of this civil remedy 
as an alternative to the exclusionary rule, is the message that it 
gives to the Police. The Courts would effectively be condoning 
· improper Police behaviour by admitting the evidence in the 
criminal jurisdiction on the basis that the person whose rights 
have been violated may be compensated in the civil court. The 
State would be buying the right to obtain evidence using any 
available method, knowing that the evidence would be admitted 
anyway. 
5 Conclusion 
There is no reason why exclusion and a civil remedy should be 
mutually exclusive. However, the civil action to claim 
compensation and damages should not .be adopted at the 
expense of the prima facie exclusion rule. There are too many 
hurdles to be overcome by a prospective plaintiff. Although the 
Court of Appeal relied on the Covenant and the Declaration to 
allow them to create a remedy, compensation and damages are 
not the most effective remedy available. 
Section 23 of the Bill of Rights Act recognises the reality that an 
individual is "ordinarily at a significant disadvantage in relation 
to the informed and coercive powers available to the State."111 
This fact must also be reflected in the alternative remedies 
available to a breach victim. 
11 1 R v Noort, above n23, 279 per Richardson J. 
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D Con/ essional v Real Evidence 
As discussed in Part ID above, the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
has not yet formally adopted a distinction between the 
application of the prima facie exclusionary rule to confessional 
and real evidence. 
If a distinction is to be made it is likely to be justified on the basis 
that real evidence may be discovered regardless of the breach of 
the defendant's rights, whereas confessional evidence would not 
otherwise be obtained. However, although it may be less likely, 
confessional evidence can be obtained through statements made 
to other people, or from the defendant after receiving legal 
advice. It cannot be presumed that a defendant would not make 
the same statement after being given his rights pursuant to s23 of 
the Act. 
It is the process followed in obtaining the evidence that is 
important rather than the possible outcomes. The effectiveness 
of exclusion as a remedy would be diminished if such a 
distinction w_ere to be made. The incidence of exclusion of 
improperly obtained real evidence would decrease upon the 
adoption of such a rule because the court would focus on the 
type of evidence rather than the fact that there has been a 
violation of a human right. 
It is significant that the improperly obtained evidence rule 
provides that the court must take into account "the likelihood 
that the evidence would have been discovered or otherwise 
obtained" without the breach. If the courts are to make a 
distinction or the Code is adopted by Parliament, then 
confessional evidence is likely to be excluded more often than 
53 
real evidence, because it is seen as less likely to have been 
otherwise obtained. 
The Privy Council appears to support treating real and 
confessional evidence in the same way. The Mohammed decision 
seems to suggest that the exclusion of evidence rules apply 
equally to real and confessional evidence obtained by a rights 
breach. This is not explicitly stated by their Lordships even 
though defence counsel attempted to distinguish King on the 
basis that the two types of evidence should be treated 
differently. 
VI THE BEST APPROACH 
There are numerous problems with the alternatives to the prima 
fade exclusionary rule, the most important being their lack of 
effectiveness. The improperly obtained evidence rule provides a 
wide discretion and allows the presiding judge to consider any 
matters he or she deems relevant. The advantage of this rule is 
that it can be utilised by a co-defendant when evidence obtained 
from another defendant is to be used against him or her. This 
rule does however produce similar difficulties to those cau.sed by 
the Grayson case - it allows consideration of factors prev'iously 
disregarded by the Court of Appeal because they did not result 
in adequate protection of human rights. 
The Law Commission's proposed improperly obtained evidence 
rule is not considered to be an effective remedy if looked at from 
a human rights perspective. If the principal reason for having a 
remedy for rights breaches is deterrence or judicial integrity the 
Commission's rule may be acceptable. However, it is submitted 
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that the remedy must reflect the fact that a breach of rights has 
occurred and must be effective to vindicate that violation. The 
Commission's rule provides for too much judicial discretion, and 
is based on the assumption that relevant evidence is admissible. 
The two primary alternatives to the prima fade rule, the Police 
Complaints Authority and civil proceedings, are also considered 
to be ineffective. 
The cost of issuing civil proceedings against the Police will be 
prohibitive for most potential plaintiffs, and the burden of 
proving a breach of the Act may be too hard for many. In any 
event, the available civil remedies of damages and/ or 
compensation do not vindicate breached rights. Adoption of the 
civil remedy in place of the prima fade exclusionary rule would 
be a dangerous move. It would signal to the Police that they 
could effectively breach a person's rights to obtain evidence safe 
in the knowledge that it would be admissible and the only 
punishment would be a possible claim for damages or 
compensation that would be unlikely to succeed. There is no 
deterrence factor present. 
The Police Complaints Authority has never been regar~ed as 
being an effective body to investigate and sanction the Police. 
Until such time as the Authority is truly independent of the 
Police and is seen by the public as such, it cannot be considered 
to be a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is stated to be an Act 
"to affirm, protect and promote human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms in New Zealand".112 As the Act itself does not 
provide any remedies, the Court has developed the exclusionary 
rule and the civil remedy of compensation and/ or damages. 
The civil remedy does not protect a person's rights nor does it 
promote them. The only way to truly protect and promote 
human rights is to punish a breach by restoring the person 
whose rights have been breached to the same place they were 
before the breach took place - by excluding the evidence 
obtained. The State should not be able to benefit in any way 
from the violation. 
This statement must of course be tempered slightly to recognise 
that there are cases where exclusion would be completely out of 
proportion to the effect of the violation on the individual. Such 
cases are catered for in the exceptions to the prima fade 
exclusionary rule as developed by our Court of Appeal and 
discussed in Part II above. Section 5 of the Bill of Rights itself 
provides that the rights are "subject to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society." However, the public policy argument must 
not be extended to restrict the application of the rule in those 
cases not covered by the existing exceptions. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The justifications for exclusion of evidence obtained in breach of 
an individual's rights include vindication, deterrence, and 
judicial integrity. The prima facie exclusionary rule was 
11 2 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title. 
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introduced in New Zealand because it was seen as the most 
effective manner in which to vindicate a violation of a criminal 
accused's rights. Although not the principal justifications for the 
rule, the elements of deterrence and maintenance of judicial 
integrity are by-products of this remedy. 
It is clear from New Zealand case law that the prima facie 
exclusionary rule is being applied in fewer cases, particularly in 
those involving s21 of the Act. This is not as a result of the 
development of the rule itself, but rather the way in which 
section 21 of the Act is being applied. 
The most significant difficulty with the way in which breaches of 
s21 of the Bill of Rights are dealt with, is the manner in which the 
Court of Appeal has interpreted the term "unreasonable". In 
order for a search to be deemed to have been in breach of the 
Act, it must first be accepted as being unreasonable. 
Until the Grayson decision the Court of Appeal had, with some 
exceptions, developed and applied the prima facie exclusionary 
rule relatively well. The Court had indicated that there were 
matters, such as the good faith or otherwise of the Police officer, 
that would rarely be taken into account in considering wh~ther a 
breach had occurred. The Grayson decision has allowed all of the 
factors that had previously been excluded from consideration to 
be taken into account. This has resulted in fewer searches being 
held as breaching the Bill of Rights. In such situations, the prima 
fade exclusionary rule cannot be applied as there has been no 
breach of the Act. 
The Grayson case involved clear trespass by the Police and 
misuse of a search warrant yet the Court held that this was not 
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unreasonable. It can be presumed that only an extremely serious 
breach will be deemed to be unreasonable by the current Court 
of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal has indicated that it is willing to revisit the 
status of the prima facie exclusionary rule. However, the Court 
has not done so to date. It is submitted that the Privy Council's 
decision in Mohammed should not be adopted by the Court when 
it does reexamine the rule, because the decision is considered to 
be fundamentally flawed. 
It is submitted that the Court of Appeal should continue to apply 
the prima facie exclusionary rule as outlined by Cooke P in the 
Goodwin case.113 The rule is based on the premise that the most 
effective way of vindicating a breach of a criminal accused's 
rights is to exclude the evidence. It should not be relevant 
whether or not the Police deliberately infringed the person's 
rights or whether the evidence obtained was real or confessional. 
The fact that there has been a breach of the Bill of Rights should 
be enough for a remedy to invoked. It is accepted that the 
Courts may recognise extrao_rdinary situations in which 
exclusion would be out of proportion to the violation. 
11 3 See quotation from R v Goodwin on page 15 above. 
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